A year ago, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s term ended. When bidding farewell, politicians did not spare his praise, calling him the most important leader in the EU and one of the most important in the West. For example, the President of the Council of Europe, Charles Michel, called Merkel a “monument” and a “shining light for our European project”.

However, it was Merkel who blocked Ukraine’s accession to NATO and forced the approval of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 Baltic gas pipeline from Russia to Germany – shortly after Russia occupied the Ukrainian peninsula in Crimea. All of this tugged at a little while he was gone.

“A different world”

February 24 this year. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said: “We woke up in a different world.” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine upended not only the postwar order in Europe, but also the assessment of German policy toward Russia. In early April, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, invited Merkel to the outskirts of Kiev to see, against the agency’s backdrop in Bucza, “what the policy of concessions to Russia over the last 14 years has produced”.

Bestselling Ukrainian author Andrei Kurkov recently told Deutsche Welle that he experiences “a lot of anti-German emotions” in the country. “Angela Merkel’s wine is talked about openly.”

Allegations have also come from Poland and the Baltic states. And they are aimed not only at Merkel, but at a whole generation of German politicians who believe in the policy of making Russia familiar with the West according to the motto “change through trade”. Former German foreign minister and current German president Frank-Walter Steinmeier pleaded guilty to a “wrong decision” that harmed Germany’s credibility. At home and abroad, the role of his party partner from the SPD, Gerhard Schroeder, is seen as scandalous in particular: a former chancellor who to this day refuses to distance himself from Putin.

Is it really a “historic breakthrough”?

When war breaks out Chancellor Olaf Scholz announces in the Bundestag “changes in German politics”, stressed that the German government draws conclusions from its previous policies. On the other hand, Scholz warned of a Third World War, hesitation about arms supplies to Ukraine, and a broad energy boycott of Russia. That’s why not everyone bought his “historical breakthrough”. Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki accused Scholz of continuing to block tougher EU sanctions.

There are other signs of just how much prestige Germany has suffered. In early April, there were protests in front of the German embassy in Vilnius against the fact that Berlin did not support a total oil and gas embargo. The Baltic states have always been suspicious of Germany’s close ties to the Kremlin, as they see themselves as the next potential victim of Vladimir Putin.

Czech newspaper Lidove noviny wrote this week that Scholz appeared “defensive”. On the issue of arms supply, the chancellor is in favor of “yes, but”. The Czech journalist noted the fluctuation in his views.

Even in Moscow, Scholz’s restraint was useless, says Eastern European researcher Volker Weichsel: – The assumption that the so-called “calm” will have a positive effect on the perception of Germany in Russia is wrong. On the other hand, Moscow’s propaganda has exaggeratedly portrayed Germany as a friend and is now just as exaggerating as an enemy, Weichsel said.

The signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact sealed the fourth partition of Poland and to this day overshadows Polish-German relations

Distrust of Berlin

Henning Hoff of the German Council on Foreign Relations sees distrust, especially among the Baltic states and Poland, who fear that Berlin wants to negotiate something with Moscow over everyone’s heads. This is an echo of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939, in which Hitler and Stalin divided Eastern Europe among themselves.

The German government’s doubts about arms supplies, an energy embargo and Ukraine’s future accession to the EU were not well received by other Europeans, said DW Volker Weichsel. – Leadership in the European Union is expected from Germany. But no matter which policy issues towards Russia and Ukraine you look at, the German government always acts very late and only under external pressure, the expert explained.

Andriy Melnyk, Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany, even expressed the assumption that “the chancellor doesn’t want to give up” weapons. Melnyk told the RND editorial network that “it seems (Germany) is waiting for the ceasefire to end. Then there will be no pressure from Germany and no more bold decisions.”

The shift in Germany’s image is also seen on a completely different plane: perhaps the Eurovision Song Contest has not been as political as this year. As expected, the audience really appreciated the Ukrainian group. But the last place may also be politically motivated – it was taken by Germany.

Paris is also censored?

If Germany loses influence, someone else might gain it. This conclusion can be drawn from President Zelensky’s statement after telephone conversations with Olaf Scholz and French President, Emmanuel Macron. Zelenskiy briefly described conversations with Scholz as “quite productive” and with Macron as “brief and lengthy”. Ukraine’s efforts to quickly join the EU were also discussed.

Henning Hoff, however, does not believe that Emmanuel Macron will become Europe’s new leader. “There is also a lot of mistrust of France” as Macron seeks to establish a “strategic dialogue” with Putin from 2019 without prior consultations with Central and Eastern Europe. In general, European policy towards Russia “cannot be left to Germany and/or France. Europeans from Central and Eastern Europe, especially the Balts and Poland, should have the right to decide together.”

What should Germany do now

Volker Weichsel sees, above all, three things Germany must now do to regain its prestige. – Support Ukraine’s application for EU candidate status with all our strength, consistently support Ukraine in its defense and make quick and successful changes in the energy sector – he lists.

Following Chancellor Willy Brandt’s policy of understanding in the 1970s, Henning Hoff recommended a new kind of Ostpolitik. It should be “directed first at Germany’s close neighbor and EU/NATO partner, and only second at Russia, which is expected to soon cease to be Putinian. In short, trust can only be regained by truly Europeanizing its policies towards Russia. – assesses expert .

Volker Weichsel believed, however, that a new self-image was needed, going beyond politics. – German society for 70 years believed that it could eliminate war from the world, if only it would never be the aggressor again. The idea that others can be aggressors and that you should particularly rush to the aid of armed victims, and not just apologize for your past actions – is unthinkable for most Germans, and thinking about this is just beginning – concludes political scientists German.