Paweł Gospodarczyk, money.pl: Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić stated that he would maintain a pro-European path, resign from the Russian military base in his country, and on the other hand want to maintain good relations with Moscow. How long can you function like this?

Dr. hab. Konrad Pawłowski, head of the Department of Balkans at the Central European Institute, researcher at Maria Curie-Skłodowska University: This is the most important question in current Serbian foreign policy. Serbia, as a country wishing to become a member of the European Union, has certain obligations which consist in conforming its domestic policy to EU rules, also related to its attitude towards Russia. The country’s position in the international arena is based on four pillars: the European Union, the United States, China and Russia. Serbs want to sit on all these chairs at once.

With the geopolitical conflicts between the superpowers escalating, Serbian diplomacy is in an awkward position, because you can’t be friends with everyone. All these parties expected a declaration from Serbia, to a greater or lesser extent, regarding the direction of development in the field of foreign policy. The EU is waiting to join the sanctions against Russia, although Serbia adopted a strategy of neutrality towards the war in Ukraine. On February 25, the National Security Council in its position referred to respect for international law and support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine. And that’s it. Belgrade will pursue a multi-vector policy for as long as possible. Some international relations experts say that Serbia is too small, there is no way to be truly neutral. In fact, there will come a time when it will be impossible to continue maneuvers between East and West.

Economically, Serbia’s main trading partners continue to be European countries. A rational approach results from geography and economics, but the problem is citizen sentiment towards Russia which cannot be ignored. Hence the tactical balance. Serbs believe that the West contributed to their defeat in all the 1990s conflicts they participated in. This anti-Western trauma, though largely extinguished, is still alive.

How is Serbia’s trade relationship with Russia? How has the war in Ukraine affected them?

Serbia depends on gas from Russia. Over the years, Russian investment in Serbia has mainly concerned the energy sector, which is strategic for Belgrade. Currently, the challenge that Vučić’s camp has set itself is to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions against Russia in such a way that they have as little impact on domestic business conditions as possible. Efforts to break free from energy dependence on the Kremlin have been made, because Serbian policy should theoretically defend state interests, and not be pro-Russian or European. Serbia cannot become part of the West for real. Hence the friendly gesture towards Russia, resulting from the expectations of society. Complicated. The Kremlin said: “we have partners, we have support in Europe”, although this is clearly propaganda. Putin, for years the most popular foreign politician among Serbs, wants to make Serbia a friend like Belarus. Serbian politicians fought over who Putin would pick as the favorite in the election, as it translated into the results. The idealist image of high-power Russia was created by the Serbian media. However, Vučić is a rational politician. He knows where the limit is.

It is interesting to note that in 2019 it was revealed that Serbia had been selling weapons to Ukraine. Missiles from the Krušik factory were supplied to the Ukrainian army and used against separatists in Donbass. In my opinion, it is possible that Serbian weapons are also being used in Ukraine today.

Are there any concerns about Russian military intervention in the Kosovo context?

This was unrealistic while the Progressive Party of Serbia was in power, even though the topic was covered in the media. The opposition accused Vučić of acting against democratic standards during his presidency, but the fact is that he ensured stability in the context of relations with Kosovo and was able to control tensions. Armed conflict is not an option, because that would be a de facto conflict with NATO, and that would be madness. Now it is a diplomatic war that has been moderated. The war in Ukraine, on the other hand, showed that the West is integrated and will not allow another front to open in Europe.

What’s next? Can we expect a “point i” on Serbia’s integration with the West?

I do not think so. Vučić will continue the balance policy as long as possible. It is not in his interest to unequivocally vote for integration with the EU, when 80 percent of the people in his country express sympathy for Russia. This is not anti-Ukrainianism, but pro-Russian idealized by propaganda. Support for Serbia’s membership in the European Union is historically low at this time. For now, the authorities have no motivation to make efforts to bring Europe closer. Sooner or later, however, Serbia will have to choose whether to fight the West as it did in the early 1990s, or follow in the footsteps of Marshal Tito, who broke away from Stalin in 1948.

Paweł Gospodarczyk, journalist for money.pl